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Abstract
This paper briefly considers the objectives of road congestion pricing and identifies prereq-
uisites to the successful application of such a pricing scheme. The paper is divided into two
sections. In the first section, a mathematical analysis of the constituents of an optimal road
congestion price is offered. The eliminated inefficiency loss achieved by the introduction of
a congestion levy is usually evaluated by means of an integral involving marginal trip cost,
travel demand and average trip cost in two-dimensional (travel time, traffic flow)-space. In
this section we show that this loss may, in fact, be evaluated more easily for a general marginal
trip cost function and a linear demand function as the difference between the areas of a rect-
angle (representing the part of road agency revenue that lies below the original trip cost) and
a triangle (representing the loss of consumer surplus of the reduced traffic) in (travel time,
traffic flow)-space, eliminating the need to use integration. The next section deals with the
application of the illustrated mathematical principles and proofs to a hypothetical case study
relating to road congestion pricing in Cape Town.
Key words: Average cost, congestion pricing, demand function, marginal cost, marginal cost pricing,
road congestion, traffic flow.
1 Introduction
The argument in favour of road congestion pricing rests on the assertion that the same
economic principles that apply to the allocation of other scarce resources should apply to
road space as a commodity. The corollary for roads is that it is not sufficient that road
users, as a class, on the average, should pay the costs of the road system as a whole; it
is necessary that each user should meet the incremental cost resulting from his particular
use. This principle is known as marginal cost pricing. The implication for road congestion
is that if each user has to pay the costs arising from his use of the road, including the
congestion costs inflicted by him on other users, the total volume of traffic, as well as its
distribution in space and time, would be influenced towards an efficient use of available
road space.
The following section of the paper deals with the mathematical principles that underlie
the determination of a price that would, if imposed, result in an optimal traffic flow on
∗Corresponding author: Department of Logistics, University of Stellenbosch, Private Bag X1,
Matieland, 7602, South Africa, email: wpienaar@sun.ac.za
†Department of Logistics, University of Stellenbosch, Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602, South Africa.
45
46 WJ Pienaar & JH Nel
a congested road. In the section thereafter the mathematical principles and proofs are
applied to a hypothetical case study relating to road congestion pricing in Cape Town.
This case study is intended to serve the purpose of an illustration; it is of limited scope and
does not purport to represent the results of an extensive traffic engineering investigation.
2 Analysis of congestion pricing principles
Two causes of urban road traffic congestion and a concomitant inefficient temporal util-
isation of available road space are (1) the high demand for travel in private cars while
maintaining a low occupancy in these vehicles, and (2) the timewise concentrated nature
of the demand for commuter trips, which realises in severe travel peaking. A contributing
factor to these phenomena is the absence of a direct pricing mechanism whereby road
users are required to bear the costs they impose on others. Among the economic solutions
to road congestion, therefore, is pricing aimed at charging road users the marginal cost of
road use during peak travel periods [3]. Road congestion pricing is a means of obtaining
better value from roads by making efficient use of available road space.
The provision of adequate public transport to divert private vehicle users is a prerequisite
to the application of road congestion pricing, otherwise the benefits of a congestion charg-
ing scheme would not materialise. A congestion pricing scheme should meet the following
requirements [4]:
1. It should discourage trips that are valued at less than the cost they impose, but
should not restrain trips that are valued at more than their cost.
2. The charges levied should be related to the distance travelled and time spent on
congested roads.
3. It should be equitable in its incidence on individual road users, simple to understand,
reliable, reasonably fraud-proof, and publicly acceptable.
4. It should be capable of being implemented, administered and enforced within rea-
sonable limits of effort and expense.
The principles involved are indicated in the following analysis of the benefits resulting
from road traffic congestion pricing. In the analysis “trips” refer to private car trips on a
specified finite road section.
In Figure 1, q represents traffic flow during the peak hour in passenger car equivalents per
lane per hour (pce/l/h); d(q) the demand for trips on the analysed road section; a(q) the
average cost per trip incurred by the drivers of private cars; and m(q) the marginal cost
per trip. Although these three curves in Figure 1 are similar to the graphical illustrations
found in texts dealing with congestion pricing [5, 7, 9], the values quoted in the figure are
based on empirical work (see §3).
The average cost per trip a(q) is computed as
a(q) = T · t(q) + r (1)
where T represents the value of time; t the travel time (as a function of the traffic flow q);
and r the vehicle running costs, which are assumed to be perceived by road users as being
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Figure 1: Private car trips to the central business district of Cape Town on the N1-route during
the morning peak hour: cost and demand functions.
the same at all traffic levels. Although car running costs rise with increases in travel time
in congested urban travel conditions, they are usually regarded by road users as being
distance-dependent and not travel-time dependent [6].
In terms of (1), the comparative costs of congestion are taken to be time costs only and
the marginal cost per trip is therefore
m(q) =
d
dq
[q · a(q)] = a(q) + qda
dq
. (2)
The intersection of the demand curve d(q) and the average cost curve a(q) at point I in
Figure 1, indicates the equilibrium flow of private vehicles during the morning peak hour,
when no congestion charge for access to the central business district (CBD) is levied. In
the figure the corresponding traffic flow is q1 = 1 600 vehicles per hour. As the cost of
congestion has not been taken into account by individual drivers, the traffic flow of 1 600
vehicles per hour indicated by I is not efficient. The optimal flow would correspond to
the intersection of the demand curve d(q) and the marginal cost curve m(q) at E, and
the object of charging a congestion levy would be to achieve the reduction of peak hour
flow to that level. This flow is optimal, because at this point no cross-subsidisation takes
place: the value of each trip is equal to or exceeds the cost it imposes [2]. In Figure 1 the
flow of vehicles would decline from q1 to q0, i.e. from 1 600 to 1 121. The appropriate levy
is represented by EG, which is equal to BD, i.e. 8,38 minutes.
The levy `(q), is equal to the difference between m(q) and a(q). Therefore
`(q) = m(q)− a(q) = qda
dq
, (3)
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or, from (1),
`(q) = q
d
dq
[T · t(q) + r] = qT dt
dq
. (4)
The imposition of the congestion levy would lead to a revenue of `(q) · q0, which is repre-
sented by the area DBEG in Figure 1. The decline in traffic from q1 to q0 will reduce the
user surplus to the extent represented by the area CBEI, leaving a net benefit equivalent
to the difference of the two areas. This difference is equivalent to the eliminated efficiency
loss
e =
∫ q1
q0
[m(q)− d(q)] d(q) (5)
achieved through the congestion levy as represented by the area EHI. It can be shown
that area EHI is equal to the difference of the two areas DCFG and FEI, or that
area EHI + area FEI = area DCFG. This relationship may be established as follows,
by utilising the fundamental theorem of the calculus:
Area EHI + area FEI =
∫ q1
q0
(m(q)− a(q1)) dq
=
∫ q1
q0
(
d
dq
(qa(q))− a(q1)
)
dq
= qa(q)|q1q0 − a(q1)q|q1q0
= q1a(q1)− q0a(q0)− a(q1)q1 + a(q1)q0
= q0 (a(q1)− a(q0))
= area DCFG. (6)
3 Congestion pricing example
Although the congestion pricing example illustrated in Figure 1 is hypothetical, the de-
mand curve and cost functions quoted are based on empirical work: In the case forming
the basis of this empirical work, the relevant roads authorities intend to jointly introduce
a congestion pricing scheme during the morning peak travel period on the CBD bound
lanes of the N1-Table Bay Boulevard entrance into Cape Town. The priced section is ten
kilometres long and it stretches from the Heerengracht-Table Bay Boulevard Intersection
towards the Wingfield Interchange on the N1 Freeway. Motorists who do not want to be
subject to the pricing scheme will have to leave the N1 Freeway at the Wingfield Inter-
change and travel by train or bus to the CBD. All alternative entrances into Cape Town
will be priced by the local authority, which will prevent (a) inefficient traffic diversion
to other roads, which increases travel distances, and (b) the displacement of the present
congestion on the N1 Freeway to other roads. A convenient, safely guarded parking lot
will be in operation at the railway station and bus terminal adjacent to the freeway from
where those motorists who divert to public transport can commence their onward public
transport trip portions.
The trip demand function was approximated from the responses obtained from a sample of
20 car drivers who traverse the section each morning. Their willingness to make use of the
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road section at various travel times over the ten kilometres, and related value perceptions
can be summarised as follows: In 2000, when this case study was performed, R1,00/minute
was a good proxy value for the travel cost of a car commuter on the surveyed road section
[6]. Based on the assumed demand function, and with no pricing scheme, the equilibrium q
(in pce/l/h) will be 1 600, and the corresponding average travel time will be 15,70 minutes
(see Figure 1).
The theoretical capacity of a lane section on a freeway with a design speed of 120 km/h
is 2 000 pce/h [8]. However, at this q-value flow is unstable and the capacity flow rate
cannot be maintained for a full hour. At a travel time of 15,70 minutes over the 10 km
section flow remains fairly stable, which serves as an explanation why the unpriced flow
can be in equilibrium at a q-value of 1 600 pce/l/h.
With the imposition of a congestion price equivalent to 8,38 minutes, flow during the
morning peak hour will be optimal, with q = 1 121 and t = 10,91 (see Figure 1).
Aggregate travel demand of the sample of drivers included in the study remains inelastic
(i.e. everybody who travels before congestion pricing will travel after the implementation
of congestion pricing). One half (10) of the peak hour private car drivers indicated that
they would continue to travel during the peak hour in a private car. The other 10 peak
hour private car drivers responded as follows: 6 were willing to travel in the hour directly
before or directly after the peak hour at approximately 50 per cent of the peak hour
congestion price; no respondents were willing to travel more than an hour outside the
peak hour, even if no congestion price is charged during those hours; none were willing
to travel by train, because Cape Town railway station was deemed too far from their
destinations to walk; and 4 were willing to participate in a lift club or a coordinated,
convenient and comfortable commuter bus scheme (with bus headways shorter than five
minutes, and the CBD bus stops in close proximity of the passengers’ destinations). The
inelastic aggregate travel demand of the drivers included in the sample can be ascribed
to the fact that their commuter trips are made involuntarily (they cannot readily change
their places of work and dwelling). Furthermore, 30 per cent of the respondents indicated
that they are compelled to commute by car as these are supplied by their employers.
Based on the respondents’ stated willingness to undertake trips at various travel times
in minutes, the assumed demand function (the number of car trips per lane per hour at
different travel times in minutes over the 10 km road section) may be approximated as
27, 7− 0, 0075q.
The average speed-flow relationship on each lane of the entire priced road section is 125−
q0,605 kilometres per hour where average speed is the average trip speed over the ten
kilometre road section in km/h. Therefore, average travel time (in minutes) over the ten
kilometre section is 600/(125− q0,605) minutes.
This relationship was approximated from the travel times of 15 test runs over the entire
road section when different traffic flow rates prevailed. Using this speed-flow relationship,
the average travel time in minutes over the entire road section at different traffic flow rates
may readily be calculated.
Marginal travel time is derived directly from average travel (or trip) time.
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Buses are more efficient in the use of road space than cars. The average car occupancy
in the morning peak hour on the analysed road section is 1,25 persons, while the average
occupancy of the buses that supplant the cars is 30 passengers. The road space of one bus
is 2,4 cars. Therefore, in terms of passenger flow, one bus supplants 10 cars, while vehicle
running costs (r) for these types of buses are approximately only three times that of cars
[1]. In terms of the practical case illustrated, area DCFG is equivalent to R5 369,59 (or
5 369,59 minutes); area FEI to R859,81; and area EHI to R4 509, 78.
This equivalency of the areas in Figure 1 holds true for any similar average cost, marginal
cost and demand function on a road elsewhere, regardless of the shape of the functions,
as shown in (6).
4 Conclusions
The optimal traffic flow rate on a roadway is where the marginal road user cost of motorists
(MC) and trip demand are equal. When no congestion price is charged, the equilibrium
flow of traffic on the roadway will be where average road user cost (AC) and trip demand
are equal, which is not optimal. The imposition of a congestion charge equal to the
difference between MC and AC at the traffic flow rate where MC equals trip demand,
will result in an optimal traffic flow rate. The peak hour revenue of the road authority
charging the congestion levy will be equal to the peak hour traffic volume in the pricing
situation multiplied by the congestion price (i.e. area DBEG in Figure 1). This revenue
will be equal to the reduction in the user surplus resulting from the imposition of the
congestion charge (i.e. area CBEI ) together with the eliminated efficiency loss (i.e. the
previous excess of MC over the value of those car trips that have been priced off the road
— area EHI ). However, it has been shown that area EHI is equal to the difference of areas
DCFG and FEI, which represents a simpler way to determine the efficiency loss.
The mathematical principles involved in road congestion pricing, as described in the pa-
per hold true for any capacity constrained facility or service to which congestion (i.e.
marginal cost) pricing is applied, e.g. rail services, airports, seaports, electricity supply
and telecommunications.
Road congestion pricing can be instrumental in ensuring that those trips whose cost is
more than their value can take place in an alternative way so that, or at a time when,
their value exceeds the cost they impose. For example, private car trips whose value lies
between the average and marginal cost that they impose can, as a result of congestion
pricing, be undertaken outside the peak travel period, or such trip makers may organise
lift clubs or divert to public transport. It is conditional to the success of a road congestion
pricing scheme that effective public transport is available as an alternative to private car
travel.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Dr Alewyn Burger for his constructive suggestions with
respect to elucidation of the mathematical content of the paper.
Mathematical principles of road congestion pricing 51
References
[1] Africon, 2008, Study on the macro-economic impact of fuel costs in transport, Contract Report,
Department of Transport, Pretoria.
[2] Button KJ, 1993, Transport economics, 2nd Edition, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, Hants.
[3] Floor BC, 1975, Cost-benefit analysis in the transport sector, South African Journal of Economics,
43(2), pp. 205–220.
[4] Fourie SA & Freeman PNW, 1980, Road pricing and supplementary licensing: The current position,
Technical Report RT/9/80, National Institute for Transport and Road Research, CSIR, Pretoria.
[5] Li MZF, 2002, The role of speed-flow relationships in congestion pricing implementation with an
application to Singapore, Transport Research Part B, 36, pp. 731–754.
[6] Pienaar WJ, 2000, The economic evaluation of bus and minibus taxi terminals and transfer facilities,
PhD dissertation, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch.
[7] Rouwendal J & Verhoef ET, 2006, Basic economic principles of road pricing: From theory to
applications, Transport Policy, 13, pp. 106–114.
[8] Transportion Research Board, 2000, Highway capacity manual, National Research Council, Wash-
ington (DC).
[9] Yang H, Meng Q & Lee D-H, 2004, Trial-and-error implementation of marginal-cost pricing on
networks in the absence of demand functions, Transport Research Part B, 38, pp. 477–493.
52
